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Key Messages
•	 Multiyear	storage	in	the	Indus	Basin	remains	limited.
•	 Water	and	food	demands	are	 likely	to	 increase	on	a	per	capita	basis	and	 in	
aggregate	terms,	as	population	increases.	Reliance	on	groundwater	resources	
will	continue.	Falling	water	tables	and	increased	salinity	in	many	places	may	
worsen.
•	 An	array	of	allocation	entitlements	economically	constrains	the	waters	avail-
able	for	agricultural	production	and	coping	with	climatic	risks.
•	 Low	water-use	efficiencies	and	agriculture	productivities	are	top	concerns.
•	 A	common	set	of	water	and	agricultural	policy	challenges	is	complicated	by	
several	dynamic	stresses	and	institutional	shifts,	including	constitutional	devo-
lution	from	national	to		provincial	levels.
•	 Most	national	and	provincial	development	plans	continue	to	focus	on	the	role	
of	infrastructure	in	addressing	challenges	of	water	and	food	security.
•	 Recent	policy	documents	highlight	 the	 increasing	 importance	of	 improving	
irrigation		efficiency,	improvement	of	yields,	and	the	socioeconomic	distribu-
tion	of	development	opportunities	and	benefits,	including	food	security.
•	 The	important	role	that	water	management	plays	in	the	productivity	of	the	
agriculture		sector	is	recognized	in	many	different	forums	and	policy	reports.	
However,	 these	 linkages	 are	 not	 always	 comprehensively	 addressed	 (with	
	systems-based	 models)	 in	 federal	 and	 	provincial	 planning	 documents	 and	
budgets.
The	Indus	Basin	Irrigation	System	(IBIS)	has	undergone	profound	changes	and	
experienced	 increasing	 stresses	 in	 recent	 years.	 Several	 recent	 studies	 have	
heightened	awareness	of	Indus	water	resources	 issues,	notably	the	World	Bank	
study	Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry (Briscoe	and	Qamar	2006).1 That	
study	 convened	 a	 team	 of	 experts	 to	 identify	 broad	 challenges	 and	 strategic	
choices	facing	the	water	sector	in	Pakistan.
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The	key	challenges	that	this	modeling	framework	will	examine	in	the	context	
of	climate	risks	are	(1)	limited	water	storage,	(2)	problematic	trends	in	surface	
water	 and	 groundwater	 use,	 (3)	 inflexible	 and	 uncertain	 water	 allocation	
	institutions,	and	(4)	low	water-use	efficiencies	and	productivity.	This	chapter	will	
also	look	at	the	various	national	policies	and	development	plans	to	address	these	
water	and	food	security	concerns.
Limited Water Storage
It	 is	well	known	that	South	Asian	countries	have	a	 lower	proportion	of	water	
storage	and	hydropower	development	than	other	regions	of	the	world,	both	in	
relation	 to	 their	 geographical	 potential	 for	 storage	 and	 power	 generation	 and	
in	relation	to	per	capita	water	and	energy	use	(figure	2.1).
No	major	reservoir	storage	projects	have	been	constructed	since	the		completion	
of	Tarbela	Dam	in	1976,	and	the	system	does	not	have	multiyear	carryover	stor-
age.	The	 total	 storage	 is	about	11	million	acre-feet	 (MAF),	 representing	about	
10	percent	of	the	total	inflow	in	the	system.	This	storage	total	is	likely	to	decline	
with	increased	sedimentation	into	these	reservoirs.	This	may	constrain	the	quan-
tity	and	timing	of	water	releases	for	canal	irrigation,	and	could	have	the	greatest	
economic	impact	on	the	agricultural	sector	(Amir	2005a,	4).	Moreover,		figure	2.2	
shows	 how	 storage	 per	 capita	 is	 likely	 to	 decline	 with	 continued	 population	
growth.	Historically,	reservoirs	in	Pakistan	have	been	operated	first	for	their	irriga-
tion	 benefits,	 and	 secondarily	 for	 their	 hydropower	 generation	 benefits.	
Interestingly,	 there	 appears	 to	have	been	 a	major	 shift	 in	 sector	benefit	 ratios.	
Work	by	Amir	(2005b)	suggests	that	the	hydropower	benefits	of	proposed	dams	
at	Basha	and	Kalabagh	are	estimated	to	be	substantially	greater	than	their	irriga-
tion	benefits.	The	benefits	from	flood	control	are	estimated	to	be	even	smaller.	
Amir	(2005a)	qualifies	 this	generalization	by	noting	that	(1)	Tarbela	Dam	has	
provided	22	percent	of	the	surface	irrigation	deliveries	in	Punjab	alone	and	has	
Figure 2.1 Water Storage per Capita in Semi-arid Countries
Source: Briscoe and Qamar 2006.
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had	 substantially	 greater	 agricultural	 benefits	 than	 predicted,	 (2)	 	reservoirs	
reduced	the	variability	of	water	supplies	for	rabi crops	and	for	delivering	water	
to	eastern	canal	commands	during	drought	years,	and	(3)	in	wet	years	they	have	
helped	expand	irrigated	area	and	reduce	the	degree	of	deficit	irrigation.
The	WAPDA 2025 Plan	(WAPDA	2004)	identifies	22	storage	projects	in	the	
IBIS.	By	2011,	 some	800+	hydropower	projects	were	 identified,	which	would	
increase	the	nation’s	estimated	power	capacity	by	some	30	percent	(Government	
of	Pakistan	Private	Power	and	 Infrastructure	Board	2011;	Siddiqi	et	 al.	2012).	
This	analysis	 is	particularly	relevant	in	the	wider	South	Asian	regional	context	
where	there	is	now	a	“race	to	the	top”	to	develop	new	reservoirs	throughout	the	
Hindu	Kush-Himalayan	region.	Although	annual	flood	control	benefits	are	esti-
mated	to	be	far	smaller	than	those	of	irrigation	or	power,	they	can	be	periodically	
significant,	as	evidenced	by	the	economic	impact	of	the	floods	of	2010.	ADB	and	
World	Bank	(2010)	identifies	the	following	key	issues	related	to	flood	manage-
ment:	(1)	the	deferred	maintenance	of	flood	embankments	resulting	in	structural	
failures,	 (2)	 insufficient	 storage	 capacity	 to	 absorb	 flood	 peaks,	 (3)	 lack	 of	
response	mechanisms	to	early	warnings,	(4)	need	for	expanding	flood	early	warn-
ing	systems,	and	(5)	encroachment	into	flood	plains	and	riverine	areas.	Post-flood	
assessments	 underscored	 the	 imperative	 of	 nonstructural	 as	well	 as	 structural	
measures,	and	their	relative	and	joint	significance	have	yet	to	be	established.
problematic trends in Surface Water and Groundwater Usage
A	 second	 area	 of	 concern	 is	 the	 changing	 relationship	 between	 surface	 and	
groundwater	 irrigation,	with	 the	 underlying	 issues	 of	 (1)	 declining	 per	 capita	
water	availability	due	to	continuing	population	growth	and	(2)	increasing	rates	
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Figure 2.2 Water Storage per Capita over time
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of	groundwater	pumping.	Although	the	population	growth	rate	in	Pakistan	has	
been	declining,	it	is	still	1.8	percent	annually,	which	portends	escalating	demand	
for	water,	 food,	 and	 fiber	 crops	 (World	 Bank	 2012b).	 Even	with	 the	 relative	
decline	 in	the	population	growth	rate,	 today’s	174	million	are	projected	to	be	
238	million	to	314	million	by	2050	(UN	Population	Division	2012)	(figure	2.3).	
Will	land	and	water	resources	suffice	for	this	population?	Moreover,	water	avail-
ability	per	capita	has	 fallen	drastically	 from	5,650	m3	 in	1951	to	1,000	m3	 in	
2010.	And	by	2025,	this	number	is	projected	to	fall	to	800	cubic	meters	(m3)	per	
capita	(GPPC	2007),	well	below	the	1,000	m3	per	capita	limit	below	which	the	
supply	is	defined	as	“water	insecure”	(Falkenmark	et	al.	2007).
Land	use	from	the	late-19th	to	early	20th	century	involved	a	dramatic	shift	
from	a	pastoral	landscape	punctuated	by	localized	shallow	well	irrigation	to	the	
largest	contiguously	managed	canal	irrigation	system	in	the	world	(Bedi	2003).	
By	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	private	tubewell	development	had	accel-
erated	(figure	2.4)	as	a	means	to	reduce	waterlogging	and	provide	a	more	reliable	
and	timely	water	supply	for	irrigation	(Michel	1967).	These	processes	enabled	
the	reclamation	of	agricultural	land	to	grow.	Cropping	intensity	also	increased	in	
many	areas	from	one	to	two	crops	per	year,	which	has	contributed	to	the	con-
tinuing	 growth	 of	 withdrawals	 for	 agriculture.	More	 recent	 data	 suggest	 that	
tubewell	development	has	been	leveling	off	during	the	current	decade,	perhaps	
due	 to	 increasing	 pumping	 costs,	 unreliable	 fuel	 supplies	 (mainly	 diesel),	 and	
decreasing	groundwater	quality.
Irrigated	 land	 increased	at	an	average	annual	 rate	of	almost	1	percent	 from	
1992	 to	 2008	 (Government	 of	 Pakistan,	 Ministry	 of	 Food,	 Agriculture,	 and	
Livestock	 2010).	 Figure	 2.5	 shows	 the	 change	 in	 irrigation	 source	 over	 time	
(Van	Steenbergen	and	Gohar	2005).	 Indeed,	most	 farmers	are	currently	using	
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a	 combination	 of	 canal	 and	 tubewell	water,	while	 a	 smaller	 proportion	 relies	
solely	on	tubewells.	Food	and	Agricultural	Organization	of	the	United	Nations	
Statistical	Database	(FAOSTAT	2012)	data	estimate	groundwater	withdrawals	at	
34	percent	of	total	withdrawals	for	all	uses,	which	is	probably	conservative.	Canal	
irrigation	remains	enormously	important,	though	it	has	been	slowly	declining	as	
the	predominant	source	of	water.	Further	opportunities	for	expanding	irrigation	
into	 areas	 of	 rainfed	 (barani)	 cultivation	 are	 limited,	 although	 they	 include	
expansion	of	private	tubewell	irrigation,	watercourse	extension,	and		high-efficiency	
irrigation	 technologies	 that	 can	 operate	 on	 uneven	 terrain	 (for	 example,	 drip	
systems).	These	opportunities	vary	by	province.
Figure 2.4 Growth in Use of tubewells, 1960–2003
Sources: Van Steenbergen and Gohar 2005; in Briscoe and Qamar 2006.
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Figure 2.5 Growing role of Groundwater Irrigation, 1960–99
Sources: Van Steenbergen and Gohar 2005; in Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 41.
Note: MAF = million acre-feet.
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Increasing	 reliance	 on	 groundwater	 is	 no	 doubt	 related	 to	 problems	 of	
	waterlogging,	 salinity,	 and,	 in	 some	 areas,	 groundwater	 depletion.	 Before	 an	
extensive	canal	irrigation	network	was	developed	in	the	Indus	Basin,	it	was	a	land	
of	monsoon-flooded	riparian	corridors	between	the	dry	upland	plains	of	the	great	
doabs	and	deserts.	As	irrigation	historians	of	the	Indus	have	shown,	the	colonial	
and	post-colonial	canal	system	had	extensive	seepage	and	spread	vast	quantities	
of	water	over	the	land	that	raised	the	groundwater	table	dramatically	(figure	2.6;	
Gilmartin	1994).
Drawing	down	groundwater	 can	 improve	 the	waterlogging	 situation,	but	 it	
can	also	increase	pumping	costs	or	it	can	tap	into	increasingly	brackish	waters.	
Figure	 2.7	 shows	 the	 particularly	 high	 proportion	 of	 shallow	 groundwater	 in	
Sindh	province,	although	it	varies	across	years.
A	closer	look	at	recent	well	records	of	water	table	depths	shows	significant	
differences	over	space	and	time.	In	the	northern	district	of	Sialkot	in	Punjab,	for	
example,	where	water	table	levels	are	relatively	high,	water	tables	have	fluctu-
ated	between	4	and	16	feet	below	the	surface	(figure	2.8).
The	 overall	 regional	 pattern	 shows	 decreasing	water	 tables,	 thus	 decreased	
waterlogging,	 in	the	basin.	To	understand	the	potential	 impacts	on	agricultural	
production	and	yields,	the	variability	of	water	levels	and	waterlogging	must	be	
compared	with	changing	irrigation	patterns	and	climatic	conditions.
The	areas	affected	by	waterlogging	and	salinity	have	been	monitored,	but	
the	costs	of	this	environmental	degradation	are	difficult	to	estimate.	A	recent	
Figure 2.6 historical Changes in Groundwater Levels
Sources: Bhutta and Smedema 2005; in Briscoe and Qamar 2006.
Note: MASL = meters above sea level, km = kilometers.
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Figure 2.7 Depth of Water table by province
Source: Van Steenbergen and Gohar 2005; in Briscoe and Qamar 2006.
Note: NWFP = North-West Frontier Province.
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Figure 2.8 Water table trends for Wells in Sialkot District of punjab, 2003–08
Source: Punjab Irrigation Department 2009, 12.
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study	 by	 Bhutta	 and	 Smedema	 (2005)	 noted	 that	 the	 direct	 annual	
	agricultural	damage	(not	counting	the	 lost	opportunities	of	more	profitable	
land	 use)	 is	 estimated	 to	 be	 on	 the	 order	 of	 PRs	 20	 billion	 per	 year.	
Waterlogging	and	salinity	have	also	adversely	affected	public	health	and	sani-
tary	 conditions	 in	 the	 villages.	 A	 more	 recent	 national	 estimate	 of	 the	
	economic	 impacts	 of	 salinity	 on	 agricultural	 production	 examined	 two	
	scenarios,	one	that	emphasizes	cotton	planting	on	the	most	saline	lands	and	
the	 other,	wheat.	Estimated	 crop	production	 losses	 ranged	 from	PRs	 30	 to	
80	billion	in	2004	prices	(World	Bank	2006,	26).
Groundwater	quality	issues	are	even	more	spatially	complex	and	pose	variable	
threats	to	agricultural	sustainability.	Overall	salt	balance	models	have	been	esti-
mated,	but	as	Ahmad	and	Kutcher	 (1992)	have	 shown,	 the	main	challenge	 is	
modeling	 the	 dynamic	 spatial	 distribution	 and	 transport	 of	 salts	 through	 the	
irrigation	system.	As	with	waterlogging	hazards,	salinity	hazards	tend	to	accumu-
late	downstream,	affecting	as	much	as	50	percent	of	the	land	in	Sindh.	However,	
recent	 village	 surveys	 indicate	 improvements	 in	 waterlogging	 and	 salinity	 in	
upper	Sindh,	as	contrasted	with	increasing	concerns	in	the	deltaic	region	of	Badin	
and	Thatta	districts	(Berger	and	IAC	2011).	Even	in	Punjab,	salinity	conditions	
vary	by	sampling	well	locations	within	a	district	and	over	time.
Inflexible and Uncertain Water allocation Institutions
An	array	of	entitlements—from	individual	timeshare	water	rights	(warabandi),	
to	canal	indents,	a	provincial	water	accord,	and	the	Indus	Waters	Treaty	(IWT)—
shape	the	waters	available	for	increasing	agricultural	production	and	coping	with	
climatic	risks.	While	private	groundwater	pumping	is	not	regulated,	surface	water	
allocation	 institutions	 were	 designed	 with	 limited	 flexibility	 that	 constrain	
	production	 under	 conditions	 of	 hydroclimatic	 variability	 and	 changing	 crop	
	production	technologies	and	functions.	Additionally,	these	inflexible	institutions	
have	been	routinely	subverted	to	effect	changes	 that	privilege	one	group	over	
another,	 undermine	 trust,	 and	 increase	 singular	 perceptions	 of	 even	 more	
	widespread	distortions.	Two	examples	follow.
The	canal	water	timeshare	system	is	said	to	have	been	designed	by	colonial	
engineers	to	operate	continuously	under	variable	flow	conditions	with	minimal	
involvement	 of	 the	 irrigators	 affected	 (Gilmartin	 1994).	 Outlets	 (moghas)	
located	 on	 distributary	 and	 minor	 channels	 had	 fixed	 outlet	 sizes	 that	 were	
opened	and	 closed	 for	 their	 respective	 shares	based	on	 farm	 size	 and	duty	of	
water	under	the	1873	Canal	Act	(figure	2.9).	Over	time,	this	system	has	been	
increasingly	 distorted	 through	 the	modification	 of	 outlet	 sizes	 and	 timings	 to	
produce	systematic	inequities	in	waters	that	are	over-allocated	at	the	“head”	of	a	
canal	leaving	those	at	its	“tail”	deprived.	Interestingly,	Bhatia	(2005)	indicates	that	
the	presumed	benefits	of	excessive	diversions	at	the	canal	head	may	not	always	
translate	into	net	economic	benefits	at	the	canal	head,	as	they	can	be	offset	both	
by	excess	water	deliveries	and	less	intensive	or	ineffective	on-farm	management.	
In	addition,	head-middle-tail	inequities	vary	enormously	in	their	magnitude	and	
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Figure 2.9 Canal Water Distribution System
Source: Blackmore and Hasan 2005, 49.
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impact	on	crop	production	(Hussain	et	al.	2003),	variations	that	are	sometimes	
interpreted	as	“low	yields.”
Indus Water Treaty
Upon	national	 independence	 in	1947,	 east	 and	west	Punjab	were	partitioned,	
and	former	princely	states	such	as	Jammu	and	Kashmir	were	placed	in	transi-
tional	status,	which	cut	across	the	headwaters	of	the	Indus	tributary	headwaters	
and	created	uncertainties	for	basin	development	in	both	Pakistan	and	India.	Eight	
years	 of	 intensive	 negotiation	with	 support	 from	 the	World	Bank	 yielded	 the	
IWT2	of	1960	and	a	bold	engineering	and	investment	framework	for	the	Indus	
Basin	 Development	 Programme	 (IBDP)	 in	 Pakistan	 (see	 Michel	 1967	 for	 a	
detailed	history).	The	treaty	allocated	upper	basin	flows	of	the	“eastern	rivers”	to	
India	 (Beas,	Sutlej,	 and	Ravi)	and	historical	upper	basin	 flows	of	 the	“western	
rivers”	to	Pakistan	(Chenab,	Jhelum,	and	Indus),	with	detailed	specifications	on	
future	upstream	development	of	the	western	rivers.
The	impact	of	the	IWT	and	IBDP	in	reshaping	the	IBIS	cannot	be	overstated.	
They	 enabled	 construction	 of	 replacement	 works	 in	 Pakistan	 that	 included	
Pakistan’s	two	major	storage	dams	(Mangla	and	Tarbela)	and	link-canals	to	trans-
fer	inflows	from	the	western	rivers	to	canal	commands	formerly	supplied	by	the	
eastern	 rivers	 in	 Pakistan	 (see	 Wescoat,	 Halvorson,	 and	 Mustafa	 2000	 for	
a	50-year	review	of	Indus	Basin	development).	The	Indus	Basin	Model	used	in	
this	 study	 was	 created	 to	 help	 guide	 investment	 in	 this	 highly	 complex	
	agro-economic	system.
The	IWT	(World	Bank	2012a)	has	endured	various	stresses	over	time,	and	it	
has	come	under	new	pressures	over	upper	basin	development.	In	2007,	the	IWT	
article	that	provides	for	the	appointment	of	a	neutral	expert	on	issues	that	cannot	
be	resolved	by	the	parties	was	employed	for	the	first	time	in	the	case	of	Baglhiar	
Dam	on	the	Chenab	River.3	In	2010,	an	International	Court	of	Arbitration	was	
convened	 to	 address	 Pakistan’s	 objections	 to	 the	 Kishanganga	 project	 under	
Article	IX	and	Annexure	G	of	the	IWT.	The	IWT	will	likely	continue	to	be	tested	
as	questions	of	climate	risk,	water,	and	food	production	become	transboundary	
concerns.	Although	some	question	the	future	robustness	of	the	IWT	in	light	of	the	
increasing	scale	of	hydropower	development	and	other	trends,	it	has	up	till	now	
worked	reasonably	as	envisioned	regarding	international	disputes.
Interestingly,	multi-track	efforts	are	under	way	among	scientists,	scholars,	and	
former	officials	in	India	and	Pakistan,	the	potential	of	which	may	be	greater	than	
has	 been	 realized	 to	 date.4	 Stochastic	 analysis	 of	 the	 joint	 and	 cumulative	
	hydrologic	 and	 environmental	 effects	 of	 upper	 basin	 climate,	 runoff,	 and	
	hydropower	development	processes	could	help	identify	paths	for	data	exchange,	
	confidence-building,	 data-driven	 negotiations,	 and	 expanding	 the	 range	 of	
choices	among	management	alternatives.
Indus Water Accord
Since	1991,	water	inflows	have	been	apportioned	among	the	provinces	by	the	
Indus	 Water	 Accord.	 The	 Accord	 of	 1991	 allocated	 annual	 flows	 among	
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the	provinces	based	on	a	five-year	record	of	pre-Accord	historical	canal	diver-
sions.	 The	 Accord,	 which	 was	 based	 on	 the	 assumed	 average	 flow	 of	
114.35	MAF	of	water	in	the	Indus	system,	allocated	55.94	MAF	of	water	to	
Punjab	 and	 48.76	 MAF	 to	 Sindh	 province,	 the	 remaining	 9.65	 MAF	 was	
divided	between	North-West	Frontier	Province	(NWFP,	currently	known	as	
Khyber	 Pakhtunkhwa)	 and	 Balochistan	 provinces	 (Mustafa	 and	 Wrathall	
2011).	Table	2.1	shows	the	minimum	lump	sum	allocations	across	the	crop-
ping	seasons.
Any	surplus	waters	in	a	given	year	are	distributed	according	to	the	following	
percentages:
•	 Punjab	37	percent
•	 Sindh	37	percent
•	 Balochistan	12	percent
•	 NWFP	(Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa)	14	percent
The	Indus	River	System	Authority	(IRSA)	was	set	up	by	the	Accord	of	1991	to	
manage	 provincial	 water	 demands	 for	 reservoir	 releases	 and	 distribution	 to	
canal	commands.	The	“Council	of	Common	Interests,”	was	 introduced	 in	 the	
1973	Constitution	and	reconstituted	in	2009.	It	takes	up	disagreements	among	
the	 provinces.	 IRSA	 does	 not	 have	 effective	 structures	 or	 mechanisms	 for	
	regulating	 its	 political	 representation	 and	 technical	 administrative	 roles;	 the	
	former	 is	 sometimes	 perceived	 to	 dominate	 the	 latter.	 In	 2010,	 IRSA	 faced	
	rising	 	tensions	 leading	to	resignations	and	near-dissolution	of	 its	membership.	
Provinces	 have	 full	 authority	 to	 allocate	 their	 apportioned	waters	 to	 various	
canal		commands	within	their	boundaries,	which	they	do	on	a	10-daily	operating	
basis.	Few	major	canal	commands	cross	provincial	boundaries	(though	signifi-
cant	river	flows,	groundwater	discharge,	and	drainage	flows	do	cross	provincial	
boundaries).	While	 the	Accord	 provides	 for	 excess	 flows	 and	 redistribution	
within	 provinces,	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 extremely	 low	 flow	 conditions	 or	
negotiated	 transfers	 among	 provinces.	A	 key	 analytical	 question	 is:	 How	 do	
table 2.1 allocations per the Indus accord
million acre-feet
Province Kharif a Rabi b Total
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.94
Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76
NWFPc 3.48 2.30 5.78
Balochistan 2.85 1.02 3.87
Total 77.34 37.01 114.35
Source: Mustafa and Wrathall 2011.
Note: NWFP = North-West Frontier Province.
a. kharif period = April to September, spring planting season.
b. rabi period = October to March, winter planting season.
c. NWFP Civil canals = additional 3.00 million acre-feet.
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these	 institutional	 	constraints	 affect	 agricultural	 production	 patterns,	 values,	
and	efficiencies?
Low Water-Use efficiencies and productivity
Low	water-use	efficiency	and	agricultural	productivity	are	top	concerns	for	the	
Government	in	Pakistan.	Frequent	comparison	between	low	irrigated	crop	yields	
in	Punjab,	Pakistan,	and	Punjab,	India	(Ahmad	2005)	find	that	both	regions	have	
lower	yields	compared	to	elsewhere	(table	2.3).	These	comparisons	are	striking,	
but	they	are	not	as	simple	as	they	appear.	Figure	2.10	shows	that	there	has	been	
slow	growth	in	the	overall	trends	in	crop	yields	from	1991	to	2008	for	all	but	
maize.	This	may	reflect	a	wide	range	of	agronomic,	economic,	and	technological	
factors.	To	what	extent	are	yield	differences	based	on	water	allocation	differences,	
as	compared	with	other	inputs	and	resource	conditions?
Low	water-use	 efficiencies	 raise	 a	 comparable	 question.	 Efficiencies	 in	 the	
IBIS	 system	 comprise	 canal	 efficiencies,	 watercourse	 efficiencies,	 and	 field	
	efficiency,	measured	as	a	percentage	of	water	delivered	relative	to	the	amount	
withdrawn.	When	 multiplied,	 they	 give	 a	 measure	 of	 system-wide	 water-use	
efficiency.	Typical	losses	in	Pakistan	are	shown	in	table	2.2.
Some	 irrigation	 scientists	 argue	 that	 subsequent	 reuse	 through	pumping	of	
canal	seepage	should	be	added,	which	would	lead	to	higher	estimates	of	system	
efficiency	(Jensen	2007).	Others	argue	for	a	shift	from	physical	water-use	effi-
ciency	 to	 water	 productivity,	 measured	 either	 in	 terms	 of	 quantity	 of	 crop	
	produced	per	cubic	meter	diverted	and	delivered,	or	in	terms	of	the	net	caloric	
or	economic	value	of	that	crop	per	unit	of	water	(Molden	et	al.	2010).	There	are	
many	 ways	 to	 increase	 water	 productivity,	 from	 established	 techniques	 of	
	watercourse	improvement,	precision	leveling,	and	on-farm	water	management,	
Figure 2.10 trends in Crop Yields, 1991–2008
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock 2010.
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to	 substitution	of	high-efficiency	drip	 and	 sprinkler	 irrigation	 technologies	 for	
some	crop	and	land	types,	as	well	as	shifts	to	new	crop	types,	varieties,	and	cul-
tural	practices.	In	a	large	system	like	the	Indus,	these	alternatives	have	complex	
spatial	as	well	as	technological	and	economic	linkages	that	need	to	be	addressed	
through	quantitative	modeling.
National policies and plans on Water and agriculture
National	policies	affect	all	sectors	related	to	Indus	Basin	management.	Of	par-
ticular	relevance	are	a	recent	constitutional	change	and	a	suite	of	long-term	and	
short-term	economic	plans	and	budgets.	These	plans	have	had	to	address	volatile	
economic	and	political	conditions.	During	the	past	decade,	Pakistan’s	real	rate	of	
gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 growth	 increased	 from	 2	 percent	 in	 2001	 to	
9	percent	in	2006	as	a	result	of	a	combination	of	economic	reforms,	the	end	of	
a	multiyear	drought,	and	increased	foreign	funding	related	in	part	to	the	conflict	
in	Afghanistan.
Increased	 growth	 reflected	 a	 combination	 of	 international	 and	 domestic	
	factors.	Pakistan	took	on	a	 large	 international	debt	position	during	this	period,	
which	made	it	vulnerable	to	shocks	such	as	the	Kashmir	earthquake	in	2005,	the	
global	food	price	spike	in	2008,	and	the	ensuing	economic	recession,	and	Indus	
floods	of	2010—all	of	which	contributed	 to	 the	drop	 in	GDP	growth	 rate	 to	
2.7	percent	by	mid-2011	(World	Bank	2012b).	An	IMF	(2010)	standby	agree-
ment	extension	 strives	 to	manage	debt,	 in	part	 through	 fiscal	policies	 such	as	
increasing	tax	revenues,	privatization,	and	lowering	subsidies.	International	eco-
nomic	 pressures,	 coupled	 with	 domestic	 and	 international	 security	 problems,	
have	eroded	funding	for	water	and	agricultural	development.
Constitutional Change
The	18th	amendment	to	the	Pakistan	Constitution,	passed	in	April	2010,	elimi-
nated	the	concurrent	list	of	federal	and	provincial	responsibilities	and	devolved	
most	of	the	functions	on	that	list	to	the	provincial	level.	These	functions	include	
agriculture,	including	livestock	and	dairy;	environment;	and	water	management.	
table 2.2 Seepage Losses in Irrigation System
Location Delivery at head, MAF
Losses
percentage MAF
Main and branch canals 106 15 16
Distributaries and minors 90 8 7
Watercourses 83 30 25
Fields 58 30 17
Crop use 41 n.a. n.a.
Total 61 65
Source: GPCC 2005.
Note: n.a. = not applicable, MAF = million acre-feet.
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As	an	autonomous	federal	body,	the	Water	and	Power	Development	Authority	
(WAPDA)	 remains	 at	 the	 federal	 level,	 albeit	 with	 responsibilities	 limited	 to	
large	water	infrastructure	planning,	construction,	and	operations.	As	the	Pakistan	
Meteorology	 Department	 (PMD)	 is	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Defense,	 it	 also	
remains	at	the	federal	level.	This	constitutional	change	means	that	assessments	of	
climate	 impacts	and	adaptation	must	devote	 increased	emphasis	on	provincial	
planning,	management,	 and	 governance.	 Further	 devolution	 of	water	manage-
ment	responsibilities	to	local	government	bodies	has	been	attempted	during	the	
past	decade	and	may	resume	in	the	future.
National Economic Long-Term Planning
The	current	long-term	plan	for	Pakistan	is	titled	Vision 2030 (GPPC	2007).	Its	
chapter	on	“Agricultural	Growth:	Food,	Water	and	Land”	includes	major	sections	
on	 agricultural	 production,	 water	 management,	 food	 security,	 and	 climate	
change—the	 first	 time	 this	 suite	 of	 sectors	 has	 been	 jointly	 addressed	 in	 a	
	long-term	 planning	 document	 for	 Pakistan.	 Vision 2030	 begins	 with	 the	
	observation	 that	 Pakistan	 has	 low	 rates	 of	 agricultural	 productivity,	measured	
in	yield-per-ha,	compared	with	peer	producers	of	food	and	fiber	crops	(table	2.3).
Vision 2030	proposes	to	address	these	gaps	and	minimize	the	impact	of	cli-
mate	 change	 in	 part	 by	 embracing	 the	 “gene	 revolution”	 (GPPC	 2007,	 53).	
Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	to	ask	how	crop	breeding	may	affect	water	demand	
and,	conversely,	how	hydroclimatic	change	could	affect	the	productivity	of	new	
varieties.	These	 uncertainties	 lie	 beyond	 current	modeling	 capability	 and	 this	
report	but	may	be	an	area	for	future	investigation.	At	the	same	time,	while	Vision 
2030’s projected	crop	yields	increase	relatively	steeply	between	2005	and	2010,	
but	flatten	out	over	the	next	20	years	(table	2.4),	the	question	is	whether	these	
targets	are	sufficient	to	meet	food	demands,	given	the	future	population	demands	
and	potential	climate	change	impacts.	This	question	is	addressed	in	subsequent	
chapters	on	modeling.
Finally, the	 Vision 2030 report—using	 the	 threshold	 of	 1,000	 m3/capita	
after	2010	and	assuming	a	persistent	high	population	growth	rate—argues	that	
table 2.3 average Yields (kg/ha) of Selected Crops in Various Countries, 2005
Country Wheat Cotton Rice (paddy) Maize Sugarcane
World 2,906 1,949 4,019 4,752 65,597
China 4,227 3,379 6,266 5,153 66,063
India 2,717 850 3,007 1,939 61,952
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6,006 2,603 9,538 8,095 121,000
Mexico 5,151 n.a. n.a. 2,563 70,070
France 6,983 n.a. n.a. 8,245 n.a.
Pakistan
National Average
Progressive farmer
2,586
4,500
2,280
2,890
1,995
4,580
2,848
7,455
48,906
106,700
Source: GPPC 2007, 52.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
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an	additional	12	MAF	of	 storage	 is	needed.	This	also	 incorporates	 the	current	
observed	 reservoir	 sedimentation	 and	 future	 projections	 of	 increased	 general	
circulation	model	(GCM)	monsoon	rainfall	of	20–30	percent.
Similarly,	 a	 panel	 of	 economists	 submitted	 recommendations	 for	 the	 next	
Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy for Pakistan for	a	 five-year	
period,	2010–2015.5	The	“Panel	of	Economists	Final	Report”	 (2010)	envisions	
the	agricultural	 growth	 rate	 to	average	only	3.7	percent,	due	 in	part	 to	water	
constraints	(table	2.5).	The	report	urges	increased	irrigation	efficiency,	which	it	
describes	 as	 averaging	 only	 37	 percent	 (due	 to	 canal,	 watercourse,	 and	 field	
losses).	It	criticizes	the	fiscal	shortfalls	of	an	irrigation	revenue	system	(abiana)	
that	recovers	only	35	percent	of	its	operation	and	maintenance	costs.	The	report	
further	recommends	accelerated	adoption	of	Bt	cotton	to	emulate	India’s	dra-
matic	 increase	 in	 yields	 in	 Bt	 cotton	 since	 2002.	 The	 panel	 also	 advocates	
table 2.5 projected Sectoral Growth rates during Mid-term Development Framework plan period
percentage per year
Economic 
sector 
Sectoral 
shares 
2008–09
Sectoral growth rates Average 
growth 
ratea
Sectoral 
share 
2014–152009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15
Agriculture 21.8 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 20.1
Industry 24.4 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 7.0 8.0 6.3 25.8
Services 53.8 3.2 3.6 4.8 5.2 6.2 7.4 5.4 54.1
GDP 100.0 3.5 3.9 4.7 5.1 5.9 6.8 5.3 100.0
Source: Panel of Economists 2010.
a. Growth rate during plan period 2010–11 to 2014–15.
table 2.4 Crop Yield targets of Major agricultural products
tons, millions
Agricultural product
Benchmark Production targets
2004–05 2009–10 a 2015 b 2030 c
Wheat 21.6 25.4 30.0 33.0
Rice 5.0 6.3 7.5 8.5
Cotton (lint)d 14.6 17.0 30.7 21.5
Sugarcane 45.3 56.7 63.4 n.a.
Fruits 6.0 7.0 10.8 n.a.
Oil seeds 5.8 7.5 8.12 n.a.
Meat 2.8 3.1 4.2 n.a.
Milk 29.4 43.3 52.2 n.a.
Fisheries 573.6 725 n.a. n.a.
Source: GPPC 2007.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
a. Mid-term development framework, 2005–10.
b. Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock, 2015.
c. Production based on regression analysis of 16 years of data (1990–2005).
d. bales, millions.
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preparing	for	climate	change,	though	it	does	not	draw	upon	any	current	research	
or	make	specific	policy	recommendations.
Note	that	the	previous	mid-term	development	framework	(MTDF)		(2005–10)	
gave	more	detailed	attention	to	physical	water	infrastructure	investment.	It	cited	
the	limited	reservoir	storage	capacity	in	Pakistan,	storage	losses	due	to	reservoir	
sedimentation,	and	irrigation	seepage	losses	that	are	estimated	to	be	65	MAF	or	
61	 percent	 of	 the	 water	 diverted	 into	 major	 canals	 (table	 2.2).	 Moreover,	 it	
sought	to	lay	out	a	comprehensive	framework	for	water	resources	management,	
along	with	support	for	36	continuing	and	15	new	water	infrastructure	projects,	
totaling	more	than	PRs	276	billion	over	five	years.	The	Agriculture	chapter	of	the	
MTDF,	by	comparison,	makes	limited	reference	to	issues	of	water	management,	
which	reflects	a	sector	gap	between	irrigation	and	agricultural	policy.
Current	federal	economic	plans	and	budgets	shed	light	on	a	number	of	policy	
issues	relevant	for	addressing	climate	risks,	water,	and	food	security	in	the	near	
term.	There	is	increasing	recognition	of	climate	change	issues	in	federal	planning,	
but	no	climate	policy	has	been	included	in	an	annual	or	five-year	development	
plan	or	budget	to	date.	A	climate	change	strategy	was	approved	by	the	Federal	
Cabinet	in	January	2012,	and	a	new	Ministry	of	Climate	Change	was	created	in	
March	2012	that	could	guide	future	planning	and	budgeting.	The	strategy	gave	
heavy	 emphasis	 to	 adaptation	 in	 the	water,	 agriculture	 and	 livestock,	 forestry,	
disaster	 preparedness,	 and	 vulnerable	 ecosystems	 (mountains,	 coastal	 zone,	
rangelands,	wetlands),	 and	human	health.	 It	 also	 includes	 a	mitigation	 section	
focused	on	energy,	transport,	and	industries.	Despite	this	emphasis,	current	devel-
opment	plans	do	not	indicate	where	climate	change	risks	would	be	addressed	at	
the	federal	level.
The	Pakistan	Planning	Commission	needs	to	consider	alternative	agency	and	
inter-agency	organization	for	climate	change	policies	and	programs.	The	Planning	
Commission	 and	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 will	 also	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 linkages	
between	 climate	 change	 and	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 policies.	 Devolution	 of	
	former	federal	sectoral	functions	to	the	provinces	under	the	18th	Amendment	
will	 require	 stronger	 policy	 linkages	 between	 the	 federal	 water	 sector	 and	
	provincial	agricultural	sectors.	This	will	require	vision	and	budget	support	at	the	
federal	level.
National Water Policies
The	 primary	 policy	 document	 in	 the	 water	 sector	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 is	 the	
WAPDA	Vision 2025,	developed	in	2001,	which	describes	WAPDA’s	long-term	
infrastructure	development	plan.	Proposed	water	projects	are	described	on	the	
WAPDA	web	pages	and	are	almost	entirely	physical	infrastructure	projects	(no	
reference	to	climate	change).	The	written	report,	updated	in	2004,	presents	the	
overall	 context	 and	 rationale	 for	 these	 projects.	 WAPDA	 has	 prepared	 a	
“Developmental	 Plan”	 that	 focuses	 on	 strategic	 issues	 and	 infrastructure	 com-
pleted,	planned,	and	phasing;	it	makes	no	reference	to	climate	change.	A	major	
Water	 Sector	 Strategy	 was	 drafted	 in	 2002,	 and	 adopted	 in	 2005,	 but	 still	
remains	in	draft	form.	Thus,	there	is	no	strong	policy	linkage	between	WAPDA’s	
The Current Water and Agriculture Context, Challenges, and Policies 51
The Indus Basin of Pakistan • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9874-6 
Vision 2025	 for	 reservoir	 and	 hydropower	 infrastructure	 investment	 at	 the	
national	 level	to	increase	storage	and	hydropower	capacities,	on	the	one	hand,	
and	the	various	provincial	water	sector	policies	that	must	address	issues	of	water	
demand	management	and	agricultural	productivity,	on	the	other.
National	 water	 policy	 is	 articulated	 in	 the	 Annual	 Plans	 of	 the	 Planning	
Commission	and	budgets	of	 the	Ministry	of	Finance.	The	most	 recent	Annual 
Plan 2011–2012 introduced	the	“Water	Resources”	sector	as	a	balanced	program	
of	supply	augmentation	and	irrigation	management.	The	water	sector	plan	and	
budget	for	2010–11	had	ambitious	aims	that	had	to	be	dramatically	scaled	back	
due	 to	 the	2010	 flood	 and	budget	 cuts.	Quantitative	 targets	 in	 the	 two	most	
recent	plans	indicated	declining	physical	achievements	and	targets	both	before	
and	after	the	2010	flood.	Although	the	plans	indicated	a	partial	shift	from	large	
projects	 to	 small-	 and	 medium-size	 projects,	 there	 are	 continuing	 efforts	 to	
advance	Basha-Diamer	and	other	large	storage	and	hydropower	projects	central	
to	WAPDA’s	Vision 2025.
Task Force on Food Security
The	2008	spike	in	world	food	prices	led	the	Government	of	Pakistan	to	set	up	a	
Task	 Force	on	Food	Security,	which	delivered	 its	 final	 report	 in	2009	 (GPPC	
2009).	 Its	 key	 points	 are	 that	 Pakistan	 needs	 to	 develop:	 (1)	 a	 national	 food	
	security	 strategy	 (supported	 by	 4	 percent	 annual	 agricultural	 growth	 rate,	
	efficient	 and	 equitable	 storage	 and	 pricing,	 increasing	 food	 access	 through	 a	
	pro-poor	 growth	 and	 employment,	 and	 transparent	 safety	 nets);	 (2)	 a	 food	
	security	index	for	monitoring	purposes;	(3)	favorable	terms	for	agricultural	trade	
and	increased	agricultural	credit;	(4)	capacity-building	in	the	federal	[now	pro-
vincial]		agricultural	departments;	and	(5)	legislation	in	the	form	of	a	Seed	Act	
Amendment	Bill	and	Plant	Breeders	Rights	Bill.
The	 task	 force	 recommendations	 focus	 on	 agricultural	 growth	 through	
increased	yields,	a	shift	to	higher	value	horticultural	crops,	and	increased	invest-
ment	 in	 the	high-value	 livestock	and	dairy	 sector.	Attention	was	also	given	 to	
enhancing	 agricultural	 water	 management	 and	 water-use	 efficiency	 through	
precision	 land	 leveling,	 watercourse	 improvements,	 water-efficient	 irrigation	
technologies,	low	delta	water	crops,	and	promotion	of	water	saving	technologies	
like	drip	and	sprinkler	irrigation.
The	 report	 identified	 water	 as	 a	major	 constraint	 in	 agriculture.	A	 serious	
structural	and	administrative	barrier	 to	achieving	the	production	targets	 set	 in	
the	report	is	the	stressed	irrigation	system,	which	is	stressed	due	to	inadequate	
maintenance	and	inefficient	water	use	that	adversely	affects	the	water	balance.	
Water	shortages	are	particularly	severe	in	the	southern	part	of	the	country	where	
irrigation	has	expanded	into	some	of	the	driest	regions.	The	non-economic	water	
prices	also	provide	no	incentive	to	adopt	recommended	cropping	patterns	and	
water-saving	 techniques.	Although	 the	 national	 water	 policy	 provides	 a	 legal	
framework	for	water	pricing	and	cost	recovery	to	ensure	effective	and	efficient	
water	management,	its	implementation	is	poorly	managed.	The	inefficient	use	of	
water	was	cited	as	one	of	the	major	issues	in	the	comparably	low	levels	of	crop	
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productivity—Pakistan’s	cereal	production	of	0.13	kg	per	cubic	meter	of	irriga-
tion	 water	 compares	 unfavorably	 with	 0.39,	 0.82,	 1.56,	 and	 8.7	 kg	 in	 India,	
China,	the	United	States,	and	Canada,	respectively	(Kumar	2003).
The	task	force	further	recommended	a	two-pronged	strategy	for	the	develop-
ment	 of	water	 resources	 to	 attain	 and	 sustain	 food	 security	 in	 Pakistan.	 First,	
attention	should	be	paid	to	reducing	water	losses	and	improving	conservation	of	
available	water	resources	to	enhance	productivity	and	increase	cropping	inten-
sity.	This	 task	 should	 include	 the	 continuity	 of	 ongoing	development	projects	
(watercourse	improvement	and	high-efficiency	irrigation	systems),	and	expand-
ing	the		coverage	of	new	initiatives	and	pilot	activities,	such	as	laser	land	leveling	
and	permanent	raised	bed,	furrow	irrigation.	Second,	new	small-scale	irrigation	
facilities	 in	 rainfed	 areas	 and	 poverty	 pockets	 of	 fragile	 eco-zones	 should	 be	
developed.	It	is	estimated	that	the	present	cropped	area	of	58.5	million	acres	can	
be	increased	by	at	least	12	million	acres	from	the	available	culturable	wastelands	
of	20.6		million	acres	in	the	country.
Task Force on Climate Change
The	 Government	 of	 Pakistan	 Planning	 Commission	 set	 up	 a	 Task	 Force	 on	
Climate	Change	in	October	2008	to	provide	appropriate	guidelines	for		ensuring	
the	security	of	vital	resources	such	as	food,	water,	and	energy.	Their	final	report,	
drafted	 in	 February	 2010	 (GPPC	2010),	 contributed	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	
climate	change	policy	that	has	been	helping	the	Government	pursue		sustained	
economic	 growth	by	 addressing	 the	 challenges	posed	by	 climate	 change.	The	
report	 acknowledged	 the	 limited	 scope	 for	 expanding	 water	 supplies	 and	
advised	that	Pakistan	would	have	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	water	use	in	all	
the	 sectors,	 particularly	 in	 agriculture.	 It	 also	warned	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 increased	
demand	 of	 irrigation	 water	 because	 of	 higher	 evaporation	 rates	 at	 elevated	
	temperatures	in	the	wake	of	reducing	per	capita	availability	of	water	resources	
and	increasing	overall	water	demand.	The	report	predicted	that	the	impacts	on	
food	security	in	the	agriculture	sector	would	mainly	be	through	reduced	crop	
productivity	caused	by	extreme	events	(floods,	droughts,	and	cyclones).	Given	
these	risks	under	the	increasing	pressure	of	a	growing	population,	Pakistan	has	
no	 option	 but	 to	 take	 major	 steps	 for	 increasing	 its	 land	 productivity	 and	
	water-use	efficiency.
Notes
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